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This study is an empirical investigation of the activities undertaken by the Welsh 
Assembly Government (WAG) in its attempts to promote its policy interests within 
EU policy-making processes. It argues that working with the UK Government in the 
formulation and promotion of UK-EU policy forms the centrepiece of WAG’s 
strategy, but that it also explores other channels through the work of its 
representatives in Brussels. As the mechanisms which enable WAG to participate in 
UK-EU policy processes are informal, maintaining good relationships with central 
government officials is necessary for ensuring quality engagement with these 
processes. WAG therefore makes a conscious effort to refrain from acting in ways 
which might jeopardize its relationship with Whitehall, displaying caution both in its 
engagement with the UK Government, and in its interest-promotion activity in 
Brussels. WAG’s strategy is also characterized by creativity. It explores various 
channels to promote its interests, working with actors such as the Commission, Welsh 
MEPs, regional networks, and other European regions. The nature of its relationship 
with many of these actors is highly informal. WAG needs to target other actors 
because of the lack of formal mechanisms at WAG’s disposal, because of the 
distribution of power between EU institutions, and because WAG is able to use other 
actors to promote interests which diverge from those of the UK Government. In 
conclusion, it is argued that the high degree of dependency on the UK Government 
which characterizes WAG’s engagement in EU affairs support the claims made by 
Moravcsik’s theory of liberal intergovernmentalism rather than those made by multi-
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 This work has been proofread for grammatical errors and minor changes have been 
made to the text. 
Introduction 
One of the most significant developments in European governance over the past half-
century has been the rise in supranational policy-making. The European Union (EU) 
has the authority to legislate in „virtually all areas of public policy‟ and scholars 
estimate that over 80 per cent of laws regulating „the production, distribution and 
exchange of goods, services and capital‟ emanate from Brussels (Hix, 2005: 3). 
Another notable trend has seen the decentralization of legislative authority to regional 
legislatures in many countries, including Spain, Belgium, and the UK (Keating and 
Wilson, 2009; Hooghe, 1993; Sorens, 2009). On 1 July 1999 powers to enact 
secondary legislation in a range of policy fields were transferred to the National 
Assembly for Wales (NAfW) (Bulmer et al., 2002: viii; Richard, 2004: 85-6). 
However, many of the fields for which the devolved legislature is responsible also 
come under the purview of the EU. As the supremacy of EU law limits the Welsh 
Assembly Government‟s (WAG) ability to use its powers, WAG engages in European 
affairs on behalf of NAfW in an attempt to influence EU policy. 
 
This study is an empirical investigation of the activities undertaken by WAG in its 
attempts to promote its policy interests within EU policy-making processes. It argues 
that working with the UK Government in the formulation and promotion of UK-EU 
policy forms the centrepiece of WAG’s strategy, but that it also explores other 
channels through the work of its representatives in Brussels. As the mechanisms that 
enable WAG to participate in UK-EU policy processes are informal, maintaining 
good relationships with central government officials is necessary for ensuring quality 
engagement with these processes. Therefore WAG makes a conscious effort to refrain 
from acting in ways which might jeopardize its relationship with Whitehall, 
displaying caution both in its engagement with the UK Government, and in its 
interest-promotion activity in Brussels. WAG’s strategy is also characterized by 
creativity. It explores multifarious channels to promote its interests, working with 
actors such as the Commission, Welsh MEPs, regional networks, and other European 
regions, even though the nature of its relationship with many of these actors is highly 
informal. The need to target other actors arises because of the lack of formal 
mechanisms at WAG’s disposal, because of the distribution of power between EU 
institutions, and because WAG is able to use other actors to promote interests which 
diverge from those of the UK Government. 
 
A Review of the Literature 
The literature on the regional aspect of European governance is a recent development, 
one which has coincided with the growing assertiveness of regions and their 
increasing importance to policy-making processes since the mid-1980s. The extent to 
which regions conduct lobbying activities in Brussels has grown exponentially during 
this period (Christiansen, 1996: 94; Marks et al., 1996a), a trend reflected in the 
increasing number of international regional associations. Furthermore, the ceaseless 
demands of regions for a ‘greater role in EU decision-making’ has led to ‘changes in 
the EU’s institutional architecture’, most notably in the creation of the Committee of 
the Regions (CoR) (Bourne, 2007: 289–90). This led to a change of discourse in 
Brussels regarding the role that regions would play in the future of European 
governance (Tömmel, 1998; Loughlin, 1996). These developments have stimulated 
scholars to investigate the role that regions play in contemporary governance.  
 
This literature can broadly be divided into two parts. The first body of work focuses 
on the growing role that regions play within their domestic political systems (Keating, 
2005; Keating and Wilson, 2009; Hooghe, 1993; Rawlings, 2003; Thoenig, 2005). 
This development, in most part a result of decentralization but also a consequence of 
the demands placed by EU Structural Funding requirements (Marks, 1993), led some 
scholars to argue that a new tier of governance has emerged. The emergence of the 
‘third level’ gave rise to the language of multi-level governance (MLG) and new 
conceptual accounts of governance in Europe (Christiansen, 1996; Marks et al., 1996; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Jeffery, 1997; Kohler-Koch, 
1996; Peters and Pierre, 2004; Smith and Ray, 1993). MLG is considered to be „an 
organizing metaphor‟ rather than a theory (Rosamond, 2007: 129) because ‘it requires 
other theoretical and analytical approaches in order to explain the dynamics of 
political decision-making in the EU’ (Elias, 2008: 486; Benz and Eberlein, 1999: 330; 
Jordan, 2001: 201). Its main claim is that ‘decision-making authority is not 
monopolized by the governments of the member states but is diffused to different 
levels of decision-making, the sub-national, national and supranational levels‟, and 
that this leads to interdependence between actors on different levels (Kohler-Koch 
and Rittberger, 2009: 7–8; Peters and Pierre, 2004: 79). Early accounts conceptualised 
the structure of governance as ‘a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers’ (Marks, 1993: 392), but later accounts did not 
portray sub-state actors as being nested exclusively within national governments but 
rather as actors who ‘operate in both national and supranational arenas‟ (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001: 4; Marks et al., 1996a). The focus of many of these conceptual accounts 
is on the distribution of authority between the levels of governance rather than on 
interaction between actors on different levels, with a recent contribution aiming to 
quantify the distribution of authority between actors on different levels in 42 countries 
(Hooghe et al., 2010). 
 
The second body of work addresses the dynamic underlying interaction between 
European regions and actors on different levels, domestically and internationally. 
Scholarly understanding of the role of sub-state actors in EU policy-making has 
increased considerably recently due to the steady stream of accounts of sub-state 
mobilization on the supranational level (examples include Kettunen and Kull, 2009; 
Marks et al., 2002; Moore, 2006a, 2007; Tatham, 2008; for a more thorough review 
of this literature see Elias, 2008: 485). Evaluations of the extent to which regions and 
local authorities are able to use their Brussels-based representatives to promote their 
interests successfully are almost without exception pessimistic (Christiansen, 1996; 
Jeffery, 2000). Most scholars assert that only the larger and most well-resourced 
regions have exerted any significant degree of substantive influence on EU policy 
outcomes (Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Marks et al., 2002; Kettunen and Kull, 2009; 
see also Goldsmith and Klausen, 1997), and that „even then it was extremely difficult 
to identify policy influence given the overload of lobbying by different actors in 
Brussels’ (Elias, 2008: 485; Greenwood, 2003: 231). Bomberg and Peterson argue 
that sub-state actors must ‘inevitably’ work with their central governments and build 
coalitions with other regional actors if they are to have any influence on EU decision-
making (2002: 219). 
 
The literature on the relationship between the UK‟s devolved nations and EU 
governance is in the process of maturing. Gomez et al. (2003) outline the dynamics 
underlying UK-EU policy-making processes in the pre-devolution era in an account 
which stresses the role of central government in defining and promoting UK-EU 
policy. In their comprehensive account of UK-EU policy-making in the early years of 
devolution the same authors present a contrasting picture, one in which devolved 
administrations engage to a far greater extent in EU affairs (Bulmer et al., 2002). 
However, they argue that the input of devolved administrations into UK-EU policy-
making processes is based on informal practices and stress that their position in the 
system is not guaranteed (ibid.: 65). Parry has highlighted the efforts of devolved 
administrations to lobby for ‘more formalized mechanisms of intergovernmental 
relations with the UK’ since the ascent of nationalist parties to power in the three 
devolved territories (2008: 114). The importance of UK-EU policy-processes for 
devolved governments means that studies of domestic intergovernmental relations 
contribute to the literature on sub-state engagement in EU policy-making. Summaries 
of the dynamics underlying intergovernmental relations and analyses of the practices 
used for the resolution of disputes argue that the lack of formal mechanisms available 
means that most disputes are resolved at the official level rather than at the ministerial 
(Trench 2007: 173), or, in cases of governmental congruence, within the parties 
(Keating, 2005: 126–7). The situation until 2007, whereby Labour was in power in 
Westminster, Scotland, and Wales, enabled politicians to limit the emergence of 
disputes by resolving them in private (Laffin et al., 2007). Keating has highlighted 
problems in intergovernmental relations from a Scottish perspective, but they apply to 
all devolved administrations. Whitehall officials are reluctant to circulate information 
‘unless there is a specific reason to do so, especially across party lines’ (2005: 124) 
and ‘there is a recurrent tendency in Whitehall … to neglect to consult the devolved 
administrations’ (ibid.: 125). This has increased the need for Scottish officials to 
develop contacts with their Whitehall counterparts, and this has been done by holding 
meetings between departments of devolved and central government outside formal 
mechanisms (ibid.: 124). The potential for diverging interests between administrations 
and the informality of dispute resolution procedures has led some scholars to argue 
that devolution has introduced ‘new points of tension and conflict’ (Bulmer et al., 
2002: 166). An early account predicted that ‘changes in party control at any one of 
Westminster, Holyrood or Cardiff’ or ‘the emergence of new policy issues with 
distinctly different implications for each of the territories of the UK’ would turn 
‘these points of tension … into explicit conflicts’ (ibid.: 167). Palmer predicts that: 
 
the overlap between European and devolved domestic competences is likely to 
create (or exacerbate) sources of tension in the relationship between the 
devolved executives and UK central government over the degree and nature of 
the involvement of the devolved authorities in EU policy formulation. (2008: 
33) 
 
She argues further that the UK’s need ‘to establish collective positions’ on EU policy 
presents an additional source of tension (idem: 36). These predictions, however, are 
based on an analysis of the legal frameworks employed to manage disagreements, 
rather than on analysis of the devolved administrations’ experiences of managing 
relations with central government. Scholars have not used empirical evidence to 
establish whether ‘tension’ does emerge between administrations or considered what 
form this tension takes if it does emerge. What effect tension (or even the potential for 
tension) has on the relationships between devolved administrations and central 
government remains unknown, and scholars have not examined the effect tension has 
on the strategies employed by the devolved administrations to promote their EU 
interests. Jeffery and Palmer attempt to measure the influence Scottish and Welsh 
administrations have on EU policy formulation by considering the nature of the 
intergovernmental relations in the UK, and by analyzing empirical evidence of direct 
European lobbying by the devolved administrations. While unable to offer a 
quantified measure of influence, they argue that the Scottish Government ‘has 
demonstrated a capacity to make a difference in EU policy’ while WAG has struggled 
(Jeffery and Palmer, 2007: 237). Studies which evaluate the activities of devolved 
administrations are rare; most tend to discuss the mechanisms available for devolved 
administrations as set out by the constitutional settlement (see Bulmer et al., 2002; 
Palmer, 2008; Smith, 2010) or the institutional structures of the devolved 
administrations’ offices in Brussels (see Haf, 2003; Moore, 2006b, 2007). 
 
The literature on Welsh external mobilization is underdeveloped. While there are no 
definitive accounts of the international activities of Welsh actors, a limited number of 
studies have been conducted on aspects of Welsh engagement with foreign actors. In 
a recent work, Royles examines the ‘extensive’ international activity of WAG 
‘beyond the EU’ (2010: 142–3), mainly in the fields of trade and international 
development. Stressing WAG’s dependency on the UK Government for permission to 
mobilize in this way, she argues that the main motives for such activities include 
economic interests and ‘nation-building’ (ibid.: 160–1). While this work is primarily 
an empirical study, it is embedded in the paradiplomatic tradition, focusing on the 
international activities of sub-state actors and their motives for mobilizing externally 
(see Keating, 1999; Paquin and Lachapelle, 2005; Kaiser, 2005). The majority of 
works deal with Welsh activity in the context of EU governance; evaluating Welsh 
experiences of managing EU Structural Funding (Boland, 2005; Morgan, 2003; 
Williams, 2003) and analyzing engagement by Welsh actors in EU policy-making 
processes. In his study of Welsh informal paradiplomatic efforts in the pre-devolution 
era, Jones charts the progress made by the Welsh Office and the Welsh Development 
Agency to develop a ‘complex network of consultative relationships between Wales 
and the EU’ in the 1970s and ’80s (2003: 121). Focusing on the motives behind this 
activity rather than on its consequences, he argues that the goal was primarily to gain 
access to EU Structural Funding. 
 
In their comprehensive studies of the formulation and promotion of UK-EU policy 
Bulmer et al. (2002) and Palmer (2008) outline the role that WAG and NAfW play in 
UK-EU policy-making. Efforts to formulate and to promote Welsh policy preferences 
are led by WAG, and it is argued that NAfW is unable to scrutinize the work of WAG 
satisfactorily as it is not privy to the confidential information that WAG receives from 
Whitehall (Palmer, 2008: 126; Bulmer et al., 2002: 62). The extent to which WAG 
engages in EU policy-making varies between departments. Palmer attributes this 
variation to the informal nature of relations between Cardiff and Whitehall. This 
„means that the level of engagement between the divisions of the devolved 
administrations can be dependent upon the attitude adopted by their central 
government departmental counterparts‟ (2008: 164). In contrast, Carter reasons that 
this variance reflects the differing levels of expertise between WAG departments 
(2002, unpag. [9]). Further work needs to be undertaken to establish the extent of 
sectoral variation and its causes. Rawlings also offers a valuable overview of the 
relationship between Wales and Europe (2003: 425–457). His analysis of WAG’s role 
in implementing EU law is exemplary, as is his broader contextualisation of Wales in 
European affairs. However, the fieldwork for the three studies discussed above was 
conducted during the Assembly’s first term; intergovernmental working practices 
have developed considerably since this period, as has the capacity of WAG to engage 
with EU affairs. Scholars were not in a position to take more recent developments into 
account, such as the new dynamics that underlie intergovernmental relations since the 
2007 devolved elections and 2010 general election. In addition, the claims made by 
these scholars are largely based on an analysis of legal frameworks rather than on 
WAG’s experiences of conducting EU affairs, and there is little analysis of policy-
outcomes. 
 
The main focus of studies on Welsh paradiplomatic activity in Brussels has been on 
the organizational structure of the representation offices of Welsh actors (Lewis, 
1998; Moore, 2006, 2007). The institutional architecture of this representation has 
changed considerably since the establishment of the Wales European Centre (WEC) 
in 1992, a lobbying outfit representing at its peak over 70 Welsh organizations (Haf, 
2003: 66). The Assembly joined the organization but also established an office of its 
own. However, the Assembly, together with the other substantial financial 
contributor, the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA), issued their 
withdrawal notices in March 2002, signalling the end for WEC (Moore, 2006: 797). 
Subsequently, WAG established ‘Ty Cymru’, a representational office with two 
sections: the first being a limited-access area, housing WAG officials and their 
confidential documentation, and the second section open to other Welsh interests 
(idem; Haf, 2003). While such accounts are enlightening, the focus on organizational 
structures means that other, potentially more fruitful avenues have been ignored, such 
as evaluating the activity and experiences of Welsh actors based in Brussels and the 
impact of this activity on policy. Another neglected area is the role Welsh MEPs play 
in promoting Welsh interests. Loughlin (1997) argues that Welsh interests were more 
actively promoted by MEPs than through the formal channels available via the Welsh 
Office and UKRep before devolution. It is currently unknown whether this still holds 
true, but it is unlikely. Regions without legislative powers tend to depend on their 
MEPs more than legislative regions (Interview, 29/6/10), therefore it is likely that the 
role of MEPs has changed since 1999.  
 
There is a dearth of „theoretically focused work drawing on the Welsh case‟ (Royles, 
2010: 143), and current efforts to relate empirical findings to theoretical accounts are 
unsatisfactory. Palmer‟s claim, that she has developed a new analytical framework 
which ‘increase[s] the explanatory potential of the [MLG] approach’ for 
understanding sub-state mobilisation by devolved administrations, is unfounded 
(2008: 163; 28–33). This new framework is based on using the concepts of ‘European 
Domestic Policy’ (EDP) and ‘paradiplomacy’ as ‘complements’ to the multi-level 
governance framework (ibid.: 28). However, she eliminates the need to use the 
concept of paradiplomacy by paying little attention to external mobilisation, focusing 
instead on domestic EU policy-making, and little value is added by drawing on the 
concept of EDP. Its main premise is that sub-state actors are likely to engage in 
domestic EU policy-making processes where there is an overlap between the 
jurisdictions of the sub-state actor and of EU institutions. As a result, EU policy 
effectively becomes domestic policy. Since Palmer notes that MLG ‘recognises that 
the EU policy process is no longer separate from the domestic political system’ (ibid.: 
28), it is unclear how EDP can ‘complement’ the multi-level governance framework. 
 
In conclusion, the literature on Welsh engagement in EU policy-making is lacking on 
many counts. The most grievous shortcoming is that there are no systematic accounts 
of the strategies pursued by WAG to promote its EU interests. Scholars have 
examined different forms of mobilization in isolation, without considering the 
interplay between different types of activity, such as domestic and external lobbying. 
Understanding this interplay is vital to understanding the role of sub-state actors in 
multi-level governance systems, and the failure to do so partly explains the 
underdeveloped state of theoretical accounts of Welsh paradiplomacy. Understanding 
of WAG’s conduct of EU affairs is further limited by the lack of recent studies on its 
participation in UK-EU policy-formulation, by the fact that the relationship between 
WAG and other sub-state actors and regional networks has not been investigated, and 
because there are no accounts of the role of Welsh MEPs in the devolved era.  
 
The pressing need for a contemporary account of Welsh engagement in EU affairs 
means that this study will have an empirical focus. It will identify the strategies 
pursued by WAG in its attempts to promote its policy interests within EU policy-
making processes, and it will evaluate WAG‟s experiences of conducting such 
activity. The central research question is formulated as follows: „What strategies does 
WAG employ to promote its EU interests and what reasons underlie the decision to 
mobilize in this way?‟ Addressing these questions requires close examination of 
understudied issues, including the relationship between devolved administrations and 
the European Commission, their territories‟ MEPs, and other European regions. It 
also entails re-examining the nature of intergovernmental relations in the UK, and the 
role of tension in intergovernmental affairs. 
 
Methodology 
This study employs an interview-based research strategy. Fifteen semi-structured 
interviews were conducted between 29 April 2010 and 16 July 2010, with 
interviewees including one current and one former WAG Minister, EU specialist 
WAG civil servants, an official from the UK Permanent Representation to the EU 
(UKRep), two Commission officials, an official from the representation offices of 
both the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels, and 
Brussels-based representatives of non-UK regions including Baden-Württemberg and 
Brittany (for a full list of interviewees see Appendix A). Many of these officials 
headed their organizations, the others holding senior positions.  
 
Fourteen interviews were conducted face-to-face, ten in Brussels, two in Aberystwyth 
and two in Cardiff. One interview was conducted by telephone and one structured 
interview was conducted via e-mail. Twelve interviews were recorded and eight were 
transcribed in full. The average duration of interviews was approximately 50 minutes. 
Twelve interviews were held in English, two in Welsh, and one in French and 
English. The use of different languages is unlikely to have presented a source of bias 
as most participants were interviewed in their native tongue, and all appeared 
comfortable during the interviews. 
 
The questions put to the interviewees varied according to the role of their organization 
and the relationship between their organization and WAG. Interviews dealt with: the 
strategies pursued by WAG and the other devolved administrations in the formulation 
and promotion of UK-EU policy; the nature of UK-EU and EU policy-making 
processes; the relationship between Whitehall departments and devolved 
administrations; the types of activities conducted by WAG and other devolved 
administrations in Brussels; the relationship between the Commission and sub-state 
administrations; and the relationship between regions. The exchanges were 
characterized by a high degree of candidness and the interview data appears very 
strong. The choice of interviewees was appropriate, especially in the case of devolved 
officials, as they all possessed a thorough understanding of all aspects of their 
administration‟s engagement in EU affairs, even aspects of which they have little or 
no first-hand experience, such as the interaction between Wales-based WAG officials 
and their counterparts in Whitehall. Interviewing officials from the other devolved 
administrations, from UKRep and from non-UK regions served as a very effective 
triangulation method, as they were able to confirm accounts given by WAG officials, 
even when noting that their organization acted differently. The consistency of 
interviews was very high with the same themes resurfacing often without prompting. 
It was clear that the high level of professional and social interaction between 
Brussels-based officials (especially those from UKRep and the devolved 
administrations) means that most officials have a high degree of awareness of the 
activity conducted by other organizations and of the challenges that other 
organizations face. However, conducting interviews with Cardiff-based officials from 
WAG‟s European and External Affairs Department, with Wales-based WAG officials 
who are not exclusively EU-experts and with Whitehall officials, would have 
provided a useful means of further triangulation, consequently increasing the 
reliability of the findings. In addition, interviewing Welsh MEPs would have 
strengthened the study, as the different perspective would have offered an insight into 
the ways in which Welsh MEPs work with WAG to promote Welsh interests, 
providing a means of further triangulation. 
 
The informal arrangements underlying the relationship between the devolved 
administrations and the UK Government means that the views of the representatives 
of these organizations needs to be treated with sensitivity. Care has been taken to 
ensure that sources remain anonymous, but since a snowballing strategy was used 
some interviewees are aware that other individuals were interviewed. Because some 
of the organizations whose officials were interviewed have relatively few members of 
staff (the Northern Ireland Executive Office in Brussels has a total of four staff 
members) the positions of interviewees are not disclosed. This holds an important 
consequence: it should not be assumed that information relayed in this study 
concerning WAG‟s strategies was divulged by WAG officials as in many instances 
the information stems directly from comments made by non-Welsh sources. There 
were instances where WAG representatives were unwilling to discuss issues, and 
some of the conclusions reached are based on an analysis of this reluctance in 
conjunction with data gathered from other respondents. 
 
Other primary sources analyzed included original data gathered from WAG and the 
Wales Office under the Freedom of Information Act, publicly available WAG 
documents (such as the Memorandum of Understanding between itself and the UK 
Government (Crown, 2010)) and statements, and news reports. 
 
The use of a single case study means that it is difficult to establish the extent to which 
these findings apply to other cases. European regions vary greatly regarding their 
level of competences, the extent to which they play a meaningful role in domestic EU 
policy-making processes, and the extent to which they mobilize outside their states‟ 
borders. The UK‟s unique constitutional structure means that much of the discussion 
does not reflect the experiences of non-UK regions. Some issues raised relate to all 
three devolved administrations, but unless this is explicitly stated readers should not 
assume this to be the case. Further research is required to establish the extent to which 
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